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Economic sanction has been widely used and increasingly a popular tool in maintaining peace 
and political stability in the world. The use of economic sanction, as opposed to the use of 
military power, to punish target countries have been supported by the Charter of United Nations 
(UN). Tsebelis (1990) modelled economic sanctions using game theory and found that any 
attempt to increase the severity of the sanctions was counterintuitive, namely the policy reduced 
the likelihood of sender country(s) in enforcing economic sanction, however, it did not change the 
probability of the target country(s) in violating international agreement/law. This paper focuses 
on the refinement of the sanction game proposed by Tsebelis (1990) to analyse international 
relations. Recent findings from various studies on the effectiveness of economic sanction have 
been used to reconstruct the game.  In contrast to Tsebelis’(1990) findings, any attempt to 
increase the severity of economic sanction may reduce the probability of the target country(s) in 
violating international agreement/law. A similar result was obtained in the case for which the 
sender country(s) applies any policy in preventing violation of international agreement/law by 
providing aids, assistances, and incentives to the target country.  
Keywords: Economic Sanction, the Sanction/Inspection Games, Mixed Strategy Equilibrium.  
JEL Classification: C79, K42, F51 
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Economic sanction has been used as a primary tool by the United Nations in order 
to maintain peace and political stability in the world. The use of economic sanction has 
been supported by the Charter of United Nations (UN). Any action with respect to threats 
to the peace will be dealt by the Security Council of United Nations (SCUN) without 
involving the use of armed forces.
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Modelling of economic sanction may be conducted by using either decision 
theory or game theory. Tsebelis (1990) argued that economic sanctions is better being 
analysed using game theory on the ground that the probabilities of success and failure in 
committing a violation are affected by the interactions of rational players. Indeed a 
country is not a human, however, any decision to violate/follow international 
law/agreement by a country have been made by rational players which can be modelled 
 The economic sanction may be perceived as an 
alternative policy to military approach (Baldwin, 2000).  Furthermore, the economic 
sanction has been considered to be more efficient in comparison to a military action in 
dealing with various violations, breaches, and aggressions (Hufbauer, et. al., 2007:5).  
In modern era, the use of economic sanction has increased significantly, however 
the effectiveness of the policy may be questionable.  This phenomenon has been debated 
for many years among scholars (see O’Connor (1940), Sunderland (1960), Tsebelis 
(1990), Pape (1997), and Hufbauer et.al. (2007), among others). Tsebelis (1990) argued 
that from 86 cases of economic sanction, only 33 cases were considered effective. 
Hufbauer, et. al. (2007) reported that from year 1914 to 2006 there were 174 economic 
sanction cases and only about 34 percent of those were considered effective. 
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as a representative agent. Tsebelis (1990) concluded that any attempt to increase the 
severity of economic sanction was counterproductive since the target country’s behaviour 
may not be affected; however the policy adversely affected the intensity of the sender 
country to implement the sanction. 
This paper aims to refine the sanction game proposed by Tsebelis (1990). The 
concept of the sanction game is discussed in section 1. The refinement of the sanction 
game is presented in Section 2. Empirical evidence from various studies will be used to 
reconstruct the game especially in determining the payoffs. The impacts of increasing the 
severity of economic sanction are presented in section 3. Any attempt to increase the 
severity of economic sanction is going to reduce the probability of the sender country to 
enforce economic sanction. The impact of the policy to the target country’s violation 
behaviour may not be easily determined. The probability to violate international 
agreement/law may increase, decrease, or remain the same depending on the marginal net 
benefits of the policy to the sender country. 
In the last section, alternative policies which may be used to substitute economic 
sanction will be discussed. Instead of increasing the severity of economic sanction, the 
sender country may reduce the target country’s violation behaviour by providing aids to 
improve the target country’s economic development. The results show that the 
implementation of this policy is going to reduce both probabilities in violating 
international agreement/law and in enforcing economic sanction. 
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Tsebelis (1990) modelled the interaction among countries in imposing economic 
sanction as a 2x2 game played simultaneously by representative agents and the game is 
called the sanction game. The row player represents target country, while the column 
player represents sender country. The target country may choose one of the two strategies 
available, namely to violate or not to violate international agreements/laws.
5
 
 On the other 
hands, the sender country may also choose one of the two strategies namely to impose 
sanction or not to impose sanction. The sanction game is presented in a normal form 
game as follows: 
Game 1: The Sanction Game!
 Sender Country 
  sanction not to sanction 
Target 
Country   
Violate a1 , a2 b1 , b2 
Comply c1 , c2 d1 , d2 
  Whereby: b! > d!, d" > c", c! > a!, and a" > b" 
Sources: Tsebelis (1990)"
The sanction game does not have pure strategy Nash Equilibrium, implying that 
there is no player who chooses a particular strategy with probability equal to 1. 
Nevertheless, the game has mixed strategy equilibrium.  Suppose the target country 
chooses to violate with probability x and the sender country chooses to enforce with 
probability y, then the mixed strategy equilibrium of the game is as follows: 
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In order to increase the compliance of the target country, the sender country may 
pursue two alternative policies. First, the sender country may increase the severity of 
economic sanction to the sender country. Tsebelis (1990) incorporate this notion by 
changing the payoffs from a1 to a’1, whereby a’1 >c1. Second, the sender country may 
offer incentives to the target country in order to persuade the target country to comply the 
sender country’s desires.  In this circumstance, Tsebelis (1990) modelled that the payoffs 
change from to, whereby. Tsebelis (1990) reported that in both scenarios, the results were 
counterintuitive, namely the probability of the sender country in implementing the 
sanction decreased, whereas the tendency of the target country to violate would not 
change.  
Indeed, Tsebelis’ (1990) pioneer approach in adopting game theoretical approach 
to analyze international sanction should be acknowledged and appreciated. Nevertheless 
there are several caveats which can be noted in Tsebelis’ (1990) model. First, the 
outcome (not violate, sanction) may not be realistic in real world. Given the target 
country choose ‘not to violate’, would it be any impact on the target country whether or 
not the sender country chooses either ‘sanction’ or ‘not to sanction’? In fact, the sender 
country does not have any justification to sanction the target country since the target 
country chooses ‘not to violate’.  
Second, Tsebelis (1990) modelled the phenomena in international relation by 
using the sanction game with aggregated payoffs. Each cell of the payoff matrix reflects 
Y"
"
the net benefits which have been arisen from the combination of two strategies chosen by 
two players simultaneously. The use of aggregated payoffs does not permit us to trace the 
elements of benefits and costs which formulate the net benefits in each cell of the payoff 
matrix. Consequently, as long as the aggregated payoffs have been used in the model, any 
attempt to change either the severity of the sanction or the incentive for not to violate the 
law, the impact of the policy to the process of the change in the elements of benefits and 
costs is not observable.  This may raise a further inquiry on how realistic Tsebelis’ (1990) 
sanction game can be to represent phenomena of economic sanction in the real world.  
III. 3.4-5*#-2-#$.&5.+,-./0#)$*&#.102- 
The revised version of the sanction game is a 2x2 game played simultaneously by 
representative agents, namely the target and the sender countries. It is assumed that the 
target country is one or more countries which run missions that have tendencies to give a 
potential threat to the peace of the world.
6
Hufbauer, et. al. (2007:44) argued that the economic sanction tend to be enforced 
gradually by the sender country. There are several activities which can be pursued by the 
sender country prior to the implementation of the sanction are: a) investigating the target 
country’s activities, b) reporting the outcome of the investigation to the UN, and c) 
 In this case, the missions have been perceived 
as a violation of international agreement/law or against the principles of the UN (see 
Charter of the UN, Chapter 1, article 1). On the other hands, the sender country is 
assumed to be a country or international authority (such as SCUN) as the main proposer 
in the use of economic sanction. 
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sanctioning the target country approved by the UN if the target country’s activities are 
proven to be a violation of international agreement/law.
7
 
 
Pradiptyo (2007) refined the inspection game proposed by Tsebelis (1989) in 
modelling the deterrence effect in criminal justice system by using disaggregated payoffs. 
In the same manner, in this article, the sanction game modelled by Tsebelis (1990) is 
going to be reconstructed by using disaggregated payoffs. Empirical findings from 
several studies will be used to develop the disaggregated payoffs of the game.  
 
Game 2: The Revised of the Sanction Game 
 Sender Country 
  Enforce Not Enforce 
Target 
Country    
Violate 
Bv – Cv, 
Bs – Ce – Cc 
Bv + Br, 0 
Comply Br,   Rb – Ce Br, Rb 
"
Where:"
Bv : the target country’s utility arises from committing a violation of 
international agreement/law. "
Cv : the target country’s disutility of receiving direct punishment (e.g. 
banned from international trade activities)."
Br : positive reputational effects to the target country for not being 
sanctioned."
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Bs : the sender country’s utility due to the success of the enforcement 
(indicated by sender’s ability in detecting the violations and other 
positive effects for international society)."
Rb : reputational benefits which have been arisen due to enforcing 
international agreement/law. "
Ce : direct costs of enforcement bourned by the sender country (e.g. costs of 
investigation). 
Cc : indirect costs bourned by the sender country in imposing economic 
sanction (e.g. the loss of potential international trade profit). 
From the target country’s perspective, the violation of international agreement/law 
that has been carried out is justified as long as it gives rise to benefits obtained due to the 
conduct (Bv). In this circumstance, the target country may be able to defend and to keep 
the mission running from any pressures. Given the target country chose to violate 
international agreement/law, if the sender country choose ‘enforce’, the target country is 
going to receive economic sanction (Cv)  and this will be perceived as disutility by the 
target country. 
Another utility will be obtained by the target country is reputational benefits (Br) 
which arise if the country has never been sanctioned. The target country may violate the 
agreements/laws, however, as long as the sender country has not observed the behaviour 
or the sender country does not mind with it, and then the sender country may not 
necessarily decide to impose sanction. In this case, the target country will have many 
accesses in the core of economic cooperation, international political relationship, and the 
trust that has been given by international society. In contrast, the target country which 
\"
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ever been or being sanctioned will only have limited access in the respective international 
activities.
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It should be noted that any attempt to enforce economic sanction is costly, which 
obviously is being bourned by the sender country. It is assumed that the costs of 
enforcement consist of two elements, namely direct cost (Ce) and indirect cost (Cc) of 
 
The utility (Bs) will be obtained by the sender country when the enforcement 
process was successful. The utility has been indicated by the sender country’s abilities in 
detecting, preventing, and solving any dangerous activities that give threat either to its 
sovereignty or the peace and political stability of the world. Those abilities give positive 
effects such as; (1) the security  for many countries from the undesirable occurrence that 
might happen as the consequences from the target country’s violation of the 
agreement/law , (2) the target country will get obstruction, so that it would be harder to 
violate, and (3) from the historical enforcement that have already been successful, the 
target country will think many times to repeat its unacceptable conduct, because the 
probability to be detected again is higher than previously. 
Another utility will be obtained by the sender county is a positive reputational 
benefit (Rb) as they have been able to retain their sovereignty or to uphold the peace for 
the world as stated by the UN. In this case, the reputational benefit will only be obtained 
by the sender country, if the target country has not done any violations (or when the 
sender country chooses payoff c2 or d2 and when target choose c1 or d1). Although, this 
reputational benefit will not be obtained when the target country chooses to violate and 
the sender country chooses not to enforce (or when the target country chooses payoff b1 
and the sender country chooses b2). 
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enforcement. The direct costs of enforcement will be bourned by the sender country soon 
after economic sanction has been implemented, for instance the investigation costs, the 
costs in imposing the economic sanction, etc. Hufbauer et. al (2007:108) argued that one 
of the biggest costs in conducting enforcement is investigation costs.  
The indirect costs of enforcement (Cc) will be bourned by the sender country as its 
potential gains from trade and also gains from international relation decrease as the 
sanction is imposed. Hufbauer et. al. (2007:109) argued that one of the worst things that 
might happen from imposing economic sanction is the loss of potential profit that should 
be earned by both sides if the sanctions would have not been imposed. It is assumed in 
the model that prior to the imposition of the sanctions; the relationship between the 
sender and the target countries was good, especially in the core of economic cooperation. 
After imposing the economic sanctions their relationship was obstructed and perhaps 
there is a possibility that the good relationship will be vanished.  
Consider q be the probability of the sender country to enforce the economic 
sanction. If the expected outcomes to violate exceed the expected outcomes to comply, 
therefore the best response for target is as follows: 
(Bv – Cv)q + (Bv + Br) (1 – q)  Brq + Br (1 – q) 
Bv  q(Cv + Br) 
The same thing happens to the sender, whether they want to enforce or not. 
Consider p be the probability that the target will violate. The best response will be 
obtained as follows:"
(Bs – Ce – Cc)p + (Rb – Ce) (1 – p)  0p + Rb (1 – p) 
!!"
"
Bsp  Ce + Ccp 
Propotition 1.1: The target country is going to violate if the utility to conduct such 
activity dominates the expected disutility of serving direct punishment (economic 
sanction) and the expected loss of reputational [Bv  !"#$%v + Br)].'
Proposition 1.2: The sender country is going to enforce if the expected benefits of 
enforcement dominates the expected costs which may incurred due to enforcement [Bsp !"
(Ce + Ccp)]. 
 
Similar to Tsebelis’ (1990) model, the game above does not have pure strategy 
nash equilibrium. Therefore the mixed strategy equilibrium is presented as follows: 
!
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Equation (1), p
*
 represent the probability of target country to violate. In 
equilibrium, given the level of punishment (i.e. Ce), the probability to violate is positively 
correlated to sender country’s direct costs of enforcement (Ce), but it is the reverse it’s 
net benefit (Bs – Cc).  
Equation (2), on the other hand, q* represent the probability of sender country to 
enforce. In equilibrium, the probability to enfroce is positively correlated to target’s 
utility to violate (Bv), but it is the reverse of the target’s miseries in serving economic 
sanction (Cv + Br). 
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Empirical evidence of increasing the severity of economic sanction can be found 
in many cases. Barber (1979) argued that the policy has been implemented as the impacts 
of the initial economic sanctions imposed were not strong enough to reduce violation 
activities conducted by the target country. There are several empirical evidences to 
support the notion of increasing the severity of economic sanctions.  
In year 2004, President George W. Bush extended the duration of economic 
sanctions that has been imposed by the USA to Myanmar. Although the aim of the policy 
primarily was to weaken the government of the target country, this decision however 
leads to the high degree of human rights violation in Myanmar.
9
 A similar case was 
found in Sudan as the economic sanctions had been tighter and the period of sanctions 
had been extended. Similar to Myanmar, violation of human right tend to be high in 
Sudan, especially in the Daftur area.
10
 The economic sanctions against Iran are the most 
severe compare to the previous examples. From 2006 to 2008, the severity of economic 
sanction has been increased three times; however, Iran still upholds the policy about 
uranium enrichment.
11
In general, the policy to increase the severity of economic sanctions can pursued 
from three different strategies: 1) increasing the burden of economic sanction (for 
instance by extending the duration of economic sanction or adding some other restriction 
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in the content of economic sanction). In this analysis, it is assumed that, by increasing the 
burden of economic sanction, the sender country will focus on imposing the direct 
sanctions. 2) The sender country may only focus on imposing the indirect sanctions by 
announcing to the international society about the loss of the target country’s reputation as 
a consequence to regard to their behaviour. In this case, the sender country does not 
increase the direct sanction, but obviously, they increase indirect sanction that more 
likely to be a social punishment. 3) The combination of both strategies above."
A. Scenario I: Increasing the Burden of Economic Sanction 
Suppose the sender country decides to increase the burden of economic sanction. 
Regarding to the revised of sanction game, it is assumed that there is a positive 
correlation between this policy and indirect cost to impose economic sanction (Cc), so 
that the indirect cost  increased as  the burden of economic sanction increased. We obtain 
the new equation as follows:"
  a
’
1 = Bv – C
’
v  '
  a
’
2 = B
’
s – Ce – C
’
c "
Where:  C
’
v > Cv, C
’
c > Cc, and B
’
s > Bs. 
B. Scenario II: Increasing the Loss of Reputational Effect"
The second policy that can be pursued by the sender country is to increase the loss 
of reputational effect (Br) bore by target that currently imposed with economic sanction 
(Cv). This policy become the target country’s new problem, because despite the ability to 
increase the severity of economic sanction, there always be will small number of 
countries which want to maintain the relationship with the target country. In other words, 
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the target country will have difficulties in accessing any relationships or cooperation with 
international society and boards.  
From the sender country’s perspective, this policy will also worsen the 
relationship with the target. Hufbauer et. al (2007:109) argued that good bilateral 
economic cooperation will be obstructed due to the loss of reputation suffered by the 
target country. As the result, the indirect cost faced by the sender will also increase (Cc)."
This policy will change the payoffs for b1, c1, d1, and a2 as follows:"
  b
’
1 =  Bv + B
’
r  "
" " c
’
1 = d
’
1  = B
’
r "
" " a
”
2 = B
”
s – Ce – C
”
c "
Where:   B
’
r > Br 
C. Scenario III: Applying Both Approach 
Although in the real world, the policy tends to be implemented simultaneously. 
Any attempt to increase the severity of economic sanction covers direct sanction and 
indirect sanction. For instance, in the case of Myanmar, Sudan, and Iran, the increasing 
severity of direct sanction (extend the duration of sanction) is also included the indirect 
sanction (loss reputational effect for those countries)."
According to the revised of sanction game, the sender country attempt to increase 
the severity of economic sanction is going to modify Cv and Br simultaneously. From this 
modification there will be adjustment to both players’ payoffs as follow: 
 a
^
1 = Bv – C
^
v  "
!V"
"
" b
^
1 =  Bv + B
^
r  "
" c
^
1 = d
”
1  = B
^
r "
" a
^
2 = B
^
s – Ce – C
^
c "
Where:  C
^
v > Cv, B
^
r > Br, B
^
s > Bs, C
^
c > Cc, 
 and C
^
c = C
’
c + C
”
c"
The new matrix game after we modified the payoffs as an attempt to increase the 
severity of economic sanction as follows: 
 
Game 3: The Revised Sanction Game 
(The Policy to increase Severity of Economic Sanction) 
  Sender 
  Enforce Not Enforce 
Target    
Violate 
Bv – C
^
v, 
B
^
s – Ce – C
^
c 
Bv + B
^
r, 0 
Comply B
^
r, Rb – Ce B
^
r, Rb 
 
From the new matrix game above we obtain the new equilibrium: 
 
!
Up to this point, the results suggest that: 
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Proposition 2.1: Any attempt to increase economic sanction will reduces the sender’s 
probability to enforce (q
’
* < q*). 
Proposition 2.2: Any attempt to increase economic sanction resulting three possible 
probability  of the target to violate, when it is assumed: 
(B^s – C^c) > (Bs – Cc) !"p
’
* < p* and 
(B^s – C^c) #"$Bs – Cc) !"p
’
* %"p* 
!
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It has been analysed above that any attempt to increase the severity of economic 
sanction will not necessarily reduces the target country’s likelihood to violate. This 
argument is supported by scholars
 12
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 that the implementation of economic sanction, 
including their adjustments, is not effective. The ineffectiveness of economic sanction 
happened when it is implemented to autocracy countries.  
In an autocracy country, the leader will only open a limited access in deciding a 
policy and sometimes the leader likely to sacrifice public interests in order to achieve 
his/her personal missions. In other words, the country tends to be united easily and strong 
enough to face the pressure of economic sanction (Bolks and Dina, 2000). To face this 
problem, an alternative policy should be considered that substitute the policy to impose 
economic sanction in order to prevent violations. "
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One of the policies that can be pursued by the sender country is developing and 
maintaining good relationship with many countries which have a potential to violate. The 
sender country may apply this policy through economic cooperation, assistance, or even 
donation to increase target country’s economic development. In this case, good 
maintenance relationship can be applied to autocracy countries.  
Fearon (2008) argued that, many autocracy countries have difficulties in solving 
economic development problems in comparison to the country that relatively democratic. 
As a result, this situation may become the sender country’s opportunity to prevent any 
violations. "
It assumed that whenever the target country chooses not to violate or their 
violation has not been detected, therefore the sender will apply this policy to improve 
target’s well being. Back to the revised of sanction game, there are some modifications 
regarding the payoffs as follows: 
Game 4: The Revised of Sanction Game 
(The Policy to Prevent Violation) 
  Sender Country 
  Enforce Not Enforce 
Target 
Country    
Violate 
Bv – Cv, 
Bs – Ce – Cc 
Bv + Br + Bd, 
– Cd 
Comply 
Br + Bd, 
Rb – Ce – Cd 
Br + Bd, 
Rb – Cd 
"
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Where:"
Bd : The benefits obtained by the target for their well being"
Cd : The cost expended by sender because they helping target’s well being 
In the case for which the target country choose not to violate or their violation has 
not been detected, they are entitled to receive aids or assistance (Bd) from the sender 
country to improve their well being. Nevertheless, the policy will make the sender 
incurred more cost (– Cd). The new equilibrium is given as follows:"
 
 
Propotition 3: The implementation of alternative policy reduces the probabilities of 
target to violate (p** < p*) and of sender to enforce (q** < q*). 
The implementation of the policy is certainly reduce the probability of the target 
country to violate. The policy is more effective than the sanctioning policy as the impact 
of the former is less ambiguous than the impacts of the former. The policy maker do not 
have to wait for target’s offending but they can directly prevent any violations that could 
be done by the target. 
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It has been showed that any attempt to increase the severity of economic sanction 
will result in three probabilities for the target and it depends on sender’s benefit-cost 
ratio. The result shows that the policy to increase severity of economic sanction is not an 
effective, because there is a chance that the target country will increase their violation 
after the policy has been implemented. 
A different result has been obtained when the sender country implements a 
preventive policy through good maintenance on the relationship between the sender and 
the target countries. The sender country may supply assistance to improve the target 
country well being. As a result, this policy is more certain and effectively in reducing the 
target country’s probability to violate agreements/laws.  
From the sender’s perspective, any attempt to increase the severity of economic 
sanction will reduce the probability to enforce. It is assumed, when the sender increase 
the severity of economic sanction, the target is going to suffer more than prior to the 
increase in the intensity of the sanction. The sender country is not necessarily prioritising 
the policy to impose economic sanction as their foreign policy. A similar result has been 
obtained by the sender country when they attempt to prevent any violation that could be 
done by the target country. The probability of the sender country to enforce economic 
sanctions decreases and at the same time the policy is effective in reducing the target 
country’s likelihood to violate agreements/laws. The relationship between the sender and 
the target is going to improve and the sender country does not necessarily to lose 
potential benefits when they apply economic sanction or increase the severity of 
economic sanction. 
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